KICS GitHub Action Compromised: TeamPCP Supply Chain Attack

KICS GitHub Action Compromised: TeamPCP Supply Chain Attack

The KICS GitHub Action was compromised with credential-stealing malware by TeamPCP, the identical group behind the Trivy attack. KICS is an open supply infrastructure as code safety scanner by Checkmarx. Between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC on March twenty third, any customers of this GitHub Action who have been pinning to one of many compromised tags would have been served the malware. The repository was taken down at 16:50 UTC, shortly after a GitHub issue was filed by a user notifying the maintainers of the incident.

The motion was accessible at https://github.com/Checkmarx/kics-github-action previous to takedown.

Update 03/24:

11:30 UTC: The “litellm” packages (variations 1.82.7 and 1.82.8) on PyPI have been trojanized. They comprise with the identical performance because the earlier operation, however utilizing a brand new exfiltration area: fashions.litellm[.]cloud. The malicious replace was revealed at roughly 8:30 UTC and was been quarantined by PyPI at 11:25 UTC. Wiz clients can see an advisory within the Threat Center.

Updates 03/23:
19:24 UTC:
The repository has been reinstated, and the maintainers state “The issue is resolved now.”

22:25 UTC: Sysdig experiences that ast-github-action was additionally impacted. They have been restricted to observing a single malicious tag 2.3.28 – nonetheless based mostly on TeamPCPs ways, we consider it’s probably all tags have been impacted.

22:35 UTC: Based on a tip from impartial researcher Adnan Khan, Wiz has confirmed that Checkmarx OpenVSX extensions cx-dev-assist 1.7.0 and ast-results 2.53.0 have been compromised. This was concurrently reported by ReversingLabs via tweet. See “OpenVSX Payload” part under for particulars. We have reported these to OpenVSX for removing.

Update 03/24 9:00 UTC: Checkmarx have revealed a Security Update addressing the problems with the KICS GitHub motion and OpenVSX plugins. They state a decision time of 15:41 UTC for OpenVSX, nonetheless we noticed the malicious variations have been current on the time of our report. Additionally, whereas new variations have been pushed, the malicious variations have but to be eliminated.

This is the second standard open supply safety scanner that this group has compromised within the final 5 days. The operation makes use of acquainted naming conventions and the identical RSA public key, permitting Wiz to evaluate with excessive confidence that it’s the identical actor. 

KICS Github Action Payload

The malicious code was injected in the identical method because the Trivy incident:

  1. The attacker staged imposter commits (commits on a fork of the repository) containing their payload: setup.sh

  2. The attacker then used what seems to be a compromised id to immediately replace all 35 tags within the challenge and level them to these staged commits

The malware additionally capabilities equally, however with just a few key variations:

While kics-github-action has ~1% of the seen public utilization of trivy-action, it’s nonetheless broadly adopted publicly and privately as an Infrastructure as Code safety scanner.

We will replace this publish with additional evaluation.

Github Compromise

The assault seems to have been completed by way of the compromise of the cx-plugins-releases (GitHub ID 225848595) service account, as that’s the id concerned in publishing the malicious tags. 

OpenVSX Payload

Both compromised extensions (ast-results v2.53.0 and cx-dev-assist v1.7.0) contained similar payloads. They have been revealed 12 seconds aside at 12:53 UTC on March 23, 2026, by way of the ast-phoenix account on Open VSX. The VS Code Marketplace variations seem unaffected.

Payload Execution Flow

  1. On activation of the extension, the brand new malicious environmentAuthChecker.js is invoked from activateCore.js

  2. This payload first checks if the sufferer has credentials for not less than one cloud supplier

Credential Gating inside the payload

If any credentials are detected, the second-stage payload is retrieved from the C2: checkmarx[.]zone/static/checkmarx-util-1.0.4.tgz

Retrieval of second stage from C2
  1. The payload makes an attempt execution by way of npx, bunx, pnpx, or yarn dlx. This covers main JavaScript package deal managers. The retrieved package deal contrains a complete credential stealer.

  2. Harvested credentials are then encrpyted, utilizing the keys as elsewhere on this marketing campaign, and exfiltrated to checkmarx[.]zone/vsx as tpcp.tar.gz.

scand() operate looking credentials

On non-CI techniques, the malware installs persistence by way of a systemd consumer service. The persistence script polls https://checkmarx[.]zone/raw each 50 minutes for extra payloads, with a kill swap that aborts if the response accommodates “youtube”. Currently, the hyperlink redirects to The Show Must Go On by Queen.

persist() persistence operate

Compromised Artifacts

OpenVSX Extensions

ArtifactSHA256
ast-results-2.53.0.vsix65bd72fcddaf938cefdf55b3323ad29f649a65d4ddd6aea09afa974dfc7f105d
cx-dev-assist-1.7.0.vsix744c9d61b66bcd2bb5474d9afeee6c00bb7e0cd32535781da188b80eb59383e0
checkmarx-util-1.0.4.tgz0d66d8c7e02574ff0d3443de0585af19c903d12466d88573ed82ec788655975c
environmentAuthChecker.js527f795a201a6bc114394c4cfd1c74dce97381989f51a4661aafbc93a4439e90

kics-github-action Releases

The v1.1 release was the one malicious launch created. Other releases, triggered routinely by the tag occasions, failed as a result of these variations already existed.

kics-github-action Tags

TagCommit SHA
v10e22ec8d1e0dda3c62bf4beffcd4a8a5db1abda1
v1.045f3749467a6017cb4fb749054b498d149dd5924
v1.18e20c7a67bb95632e2040327a355fb97e6014d29
v1.293de85c910d859b759cf9185aa78d5a23a4b7000
v1.30e7343ba084735863db92b6f8ba2fa9dee604f7c
v1.42dc0fa613f6f4c15f26ad98225ad253475681616
v1.5f00191dd3352c0cd83c6cce4e6bf04b628214dd0
v1.6e0359b1a253ee66c8018586c3225e6e9cd2d8a4f
v1.6.1dc6dbf358998c0c64da83edc8fcd581c12656b19
v1.6.208b9ea97eb292d5e1f9ac2d8e21c0ba32f0fdff0
v1.6.3005fb0837553de722f8bf11d98e905dbdde19861
v1.7.0a5471d37c656ecd4560e8e0b3977910f27025618
v23d49875ed47c6b8b4c8b50e0421418cf6b9f35f4
v2.0.0121c38fb49c9fc82160245fb6e2a9119db636e4d
v2.1.01e9eeaba37fe0032deba133f598e74dab0ceb3b7
v2.1.1c5c07508527fc6a125855eebfb533e64f675bd8e
v2.1.2c999dbb9cc904e23675f9929f7e0e51d132879cf
v2.1.34ebf62dd8ff318412b38d19841fc3c8650e294bf
v2.1.43ae9f0d6f8139964635d411149f9b3e0a6eb935e
v2.1.596a0e8eb31c3cce6c495c9a49dd49c881cd17934
v2.1.631fbf5831a2e52429738fdc0cbaa20e57872b6fc
v2.1.7fca3a20afcb8ec7f9932c060a236d2a9021fdd2b
v2.1.80f81f132f9f09bb4976d403914a44a1a1eb6158d
v2.1.9c0e23718a5074f3b8ad286f37b532e02057af35f
v2.1.10d66f0657133bc42f8264458063999bf1910490db
v2.1.11e35c9d6a5faffc1c5b3450d0bf09006aa9b9e906
v2.1.122eee333d70fb6e14ce1d4aa73f12058bc5d70193
v2.1.13f9641eb512f5c6530d13275903e8a97baf0925f1
v2.1.14e8754eebc822b5122e96a6142b28dbc0e179c91c
v2.1.1569b3f020390222a9fcb6029ba56533b2fb12f103
v2.1.16db942a0dd7e9d1aeac72bc675bdb67f39a688b63
v2.1.17208813bf5feca5df9a935363cd426bc914614d0b
v2.1.183fdeadb81fbeddc1453163cc87bc173911fd47e2
v2.1.19310734c0ffd29438f6195a24e2cbbacfdc33c9ab
v2.1.20b974e53df1e3a2cd22ea90f0ec01882394feede4

Which actions ought to safety groups take?

  1. Audit KICS GitHub Actions references: Review workflows utilizing kics-github-action. If you referenced a model tag reasonably than a SHA, verify workflow run logs from the publicity window for indicators of compromise.

  2. Search for exfiltration artifacts: Look for repositories named docs-tpcp in your GitHub group, which can point out profitable exfiltration by way of the fallback mechanism.

Long-term hardening: Refer to Wiz’s How to Harden GitHub Actions: The Unofficial Guide

How can Wiz assist?

Wiz clients ought to proceed to watch the advisory within the Wiz Threat Center for ongoing steerage, pre-built queries, and references to related detections they will use to evaluate the danger  of their surroundings.

Worried you’ve been impacted? Connect with the Wiz Incident Response team.

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